Although several mechanisms can promote cooperative behavior, there is no general consensus about why cooperation survives when the most profitable action for an individual is to defect, especially when the population is well mixed. Here we show that when a replicator such as evolutionary game dynamics takes place on interdependent networks, cooperative behavior is fixed on the system. Remarkably, we analytically and numerically show that this is even the case for well-mixed populations. Our results open the path to mechanisms able to sustain cooperation and can provide hints for controlling its rise and fall in a variety of biological and social systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The onset of global cooperation in large populations of unrelated agents when defective actions provide the largest short-term benefits at the individual level constitutes one of the most amazing puzzles for evolutionary dynamics [1] [2] [3] [4] . Recently, the structure of the interactions among individuals seems to have provided a way out for cooperation to survive in those scenarios, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, in which defective behaviors are evolutionarily favored under the well-mixed assumption [5] [6] [7] . Although recent results have shown that network reciprocity is not always a viable mechanism to explain cooperation among humans [8] , larger cooperative levels are achieved if an evolutionary game dynamics takes place on top of structured populations and networks, in which nodes account for players and links represent the existence of game interactions. Moreover, further including real structural patterns of large systems [9] (scalefree distribution for the number of contacts a player has [10] [11] [12] [13] , the small-world properties [14, 15] , nonzero density of triads [16, 17] , etc.) provides also high cooperative outputs.
On the other hand, in most cases a real populationbe it a biological or a social system-is not isolated and interactions take place at and between different levels (or layers) following different rules [18, 19] . Think, for instance, of an economical system, where different levels account for different competitive markets and their interdependencies (developers, manufactures, providers). The rules governing the interactions at one layer are not necessarily the same as those driving the dynamics at another layer; admittedly, within each layer competition should exist while this is not necessarily the case for interlayer interactions. Thus, a natural question arises as to whether the observed degree of interdependency in real systems is a relevant factor for the emergence and survival of cooperative behavior.
The previous interdependency, which is also referred to as multiplexity, can be easily incorporated into the framework of any dynamical process by coupling two or more networked populations in which links between individuals of the same population involve a different dynamical relationship to those established between members of different populations [20] [21] [22] [23] . In this paper, we focus on the case in which an evolutionary PD game drives the interactions between agents of the same population. In turn, the existence of links between agents of different populations allow the two networks to interact. We will assume that the latter interactions are ruled by the Snowdrift (SD) game. In this way, defection is punished when facing other defectors outside the original population, thus balancing the evolutionary advantage that defectors find by exploiting cooperators in their respective populations.
We henceforth analyze what new emergent behavior results from the multilevel nature. As a first step in understanding multilevel structures, we investigate a system made up by two populations that interact through a number of links connecting nodes located at each subsystem. Let us remark that, in this simple framework, the two populations do not overlap (i.e., each individual belongs to only one of the two populations considered). Exact analytical calculations can be carried out for the case in which the population of each layer is well mixed, through the nonlinear analysis of the two-coupled-variable replicator equation for the strategic densities in both layers. Our results show the emergence of a polarized state in which all the individuals in one of the populations cooperate while all in the other population defect. In addition we find quasipolarized states, so that all the agents in one population are defectors, while most of the other one cooperate. Moreover, we also numerically show that the previous results hold for the case of networked populations. As we will discuss later on, our findings provide mechanisms for the rise and survival of cooperation and for its control.
Let us first describe the evolutionary dynamics of two interacting populations of size N 1 and N 2 (see Fig. 1 ). Two agents belonging to the same population α (= 1,2) play a PD game so that a cooperator facing a cooperator (defector) in population α obtains a payoff R = 1 (S = 0). On the other hand, a defector facing a cooperator (defector) obtains a benefit of T = b > 1 (P = r 0). The games played between agents of different populations follow the same parametrization except for the situation in which two defectors meet. In this case, the associated punishment is negative, P = < 0, thus interpopulation games follow the SD formulation. Importantly, the strategists' competition for replication only occurs among own-population players. That is to say that there is no "interbreeding" (as it happens for different species, in biological contexts) or "strategic diffusion" (as for functionally heterogeneous layers in social or economical contexts) among the individuals of different populations. In terms of imperfect (and/or irrelevant) knowledge, the strategists from a population are unaware of the replicating success of strategies in the other population (and/or this information is irrelevant for its replication).
II. WELL-MIXED POPULATION LIMIT
To start with, consider the case in which agents of the same population (layer) are well mixed. Let us also assume that both N 1 and N 2 are large enough (i.e., N 1 ,N 2 1). Under these simple assumptions, an exact analytical description via the analysis of the phase portrait of the two-dimensional replicator equation for two-by-two matrix games is possible. In our wellmixed population approximation an individual in population α has N α − 1 neighbors inside this population. Moreover, for interactions between the two layers, we suppose that any pair of nodes (each one of a different population) is present with probability p. Thus, the number of interpopulation links is equal to pN 1 N 2 .
Let us call x α the fraction of cooperators in the population α. The replicator equations for the evolutionary game dynamics
The results of the theoretical analysis (see appendix) of these coupled deterministic equations are illustrated in Fig. 2 for the symmetric (thus nongeneric) case N 1 = N 2 , and the simple weak (r = 0) PD game for those intrapopulation encounters. Below we will comment on the main qualitative changes for the generic case [i.e., whenever both the size proportion β = quasipolarized states loose stability becomes
In other words, the weak PD limit (r = 0) for the intrapopulation game is structurally stable with respect to (small enough) positive parametric variations of the game parameter r. For r > −p , the scenario changes drastically: D is now a stable equilibrium, but still, for b < b up (which doesn't depend on r), the polarized states are also stable equilibria. Only for larger b > b up values of the temptation, D becomes the unique global attractor. Summarizing the results for the symmetric case, the attractor states for increasing values of
when 0 r < −p while, when r > −p , the sequence is
For the general case N 1 = N 2 , the lack of the population interchange symmetry modifies some of the features seen in the symmetric case. Without loss of generality, we assume that β = N 1 /N 2 > 1. On one hand, the lower bound of r for the stability of the fully defective state D becomes now r = −βp . On the other hand, the bifurcation values at which the polarized states lose their stability are now different, 
Let us note that the polarized state A, where the defective population is of larger size, turns out to have a wider range of stability, as well as a larger basin of attraction, than the state B. The results of the complete analysis of the replicator equation (1) are summarized in Table I , where we show the sequences of attractors coexisting in phase space. The seven scenarios (a)-(g) correspond to different ranges of values of the parameters r, β, p, and (see Appendix for further details).
III. EVOLUTION ON RANDOM NETWORKS
From the previous analysis of well-mixed populations, one sees that polarized and quasipolarized states appear as generic attractors of the evolutionary dynamics for wide ranges of model parameters, which in turn has the effect of enhancing in a remarkable way the asymptotic levels of cooperation in the two-population system. On the other hand, for structured populations, where individuals interact with their neighbors as dictated by a given network of contacts, it is known that under some assumptions cooperation is enhanced, a phenomenon called network reciprocity [10, 24] .
While for well-mixed populations, the stability of polarized states extends down to b = 1 + , one should expect that at small b > 1 values, the enhancement of cooperative fluctuations 
due to network reciprocity in the defective population 1 destabilizes the polarized states below some critical value b low . Moreover, one should also expect b low to decrease with the parameter p, because higher values of p increase the payoff that a (defector) individual in population 1 obtains from encounters with (cooperator) individuals of population 2, thus decreasing the resilience of cooperative fluctuations (network reciprocity) in population 1. In other words, for low values of b, the interaction between populations acts against network reciprocity. These expectations are fully confirmed by the results from simulations of the evolutionary dynamics in populations with a random network structure of intrapopulation contacts, using the discrete version of replicator dynamics.
In Fig. 3 we show the average cooperation c level (over a sample of 200 different realizations) on the two- population system as a function of b for different values of p and parameters as indicated. The two populations have a random (Erdös-Rényi [9] ) network of contacts with average degree k = 6. In the initial conditions, the individuals of both populations were chosen cooperators with probability 1/2. The plateau at c = 1/2 points out the asymptotic polarized state. Moreover, the states with c < 1/2 correspond to quasipolarized regimes where all the individuals in one population are defectors, while those with c > 1/2, at values of b < b low , result from states where all the individuals in one population are cooperators. This represents a type of quasipolarized states that were not found to be attractors of the dynamics for well-mixed populations. The comparison with the average cooperation level for noninteracting populations (p = 0 in Fig. 3 ) confirms that for low values of b the interpopulation interaction acts against network reciprocity. From a complementary perspective, the networked populations show new attractors, impossible to be so for coupled wellmixed populations because they are the effect of network reciprocity. On the other hand, for larger values of b, the populations' coupling favors the achievement of substantial levels of cooperation, well beyond the typical values of b for which network reciprocity ceases to be effective, this being an effect already present in the well-mixed case. This clarifies further the confluent effects of these two different mechanisms of cooperation enhancement.
Finally, the robustness of polarized and quasipolarized states suggests the use of the coupling to a defective population as an engineered (control) procedure to induce high levels of cooperation in a target population. To check for this possibility, we have coupled a large population 1 with random (equiprobable in strategies) initial conditions to a smaller defective population 2. In Fig. 4 
IV. CONCLUSION
Summarizing, two PD populations SD coupled in conditions of strict inbreeding (no interpopulation strategic diffusion) evolve easily to polarized and quasipolarized strategic probability densities in the well-mixed thermodynamical limit of the evolutionary replicator dynamics. This happens also when population structure is a complex network of contacts, where other mechanisms (known as network reciprocity) of enhanced cooperation also operate. The confluence of both mechanisms has been analyzed in depth showing that polarization opposes network reciprocity at small values of the temptation parameter, while both act (synergy) together enhancing cooperation in one of the layers for higher temptation values. This phenomenon, that could be rationalized as the effect of incorporating a punishment to defective interpopulation encounters, illustrates the remarkable effects that structural multiplexity introduces in evolutionary dynamics. 
APPENDIX: PHASE PORTRAIT ANALYSIS OF THE TWO-VARIABLE REPLICATOR EQUATION
The replicator equation that describes the continuum time evolution of the cooperator fractions x 1 (t), x 2 (t) in subpopulations 1 and 2 can be written aṡ
where the velocities F 1,2 , after time rescaling, are explicitly given as
The unit square 0 x 1 ,x 2 1 is the invariant set of interest here. To follow the phase portrait variation of a two-degrees of freedom nonlinear system such as Eq. (A1) is pretty straightforward for one-parameter variations. We are dealing with a model where b, r, , β, and p are free model parameters, each one inside their natural range (i.e., b > 1 + , 0 r 1, < 0 − , β 1, and 0 p 1). In our systematics below, we will consider continuum variation of b, from b = 1 + up to infinity, at fixed values of the other parameters and so we will obtain the critical (bifurcation) points b * ( ,r; β,p), where the phase portrait of the evolution experiences qualitative changes: the direction of increasing temptation b is most often considered in recent literature on PD games. But we will pay due attention also to variations of the parameter r and find two important critical values that do not depend on the value of the temptation b so that different scenarios of phase transitions (inside the well-mixed population approximation to the thermodynamical limit N 1 ,N 2 → ∞) as b varies do appear. Finally, we choose also β as an interesting (e.g., for control applications) parameter to vary, and find also two critical values that are temptation independent, which in turn increases the number of those scenarios.
The best visualization of the velocity field is a phase portrait where fixed (equilibrium) points and nullclines are also plotted, as in Fig. 1 in the main text. A nullcline is the locus of points defined by F i (x 1 ,x 2 ) = 0 for some i. The nullclines that correspond to F 1 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = 0 are the straight lines
while those that correspond to F 2 (x 1 ,x 2 ) = 0 are
The possible equilibria are the crossing points of any line from the first group with any other line from the second one, so there are nine candidates. Moreover, only solutions in the unit square, 0 x 1 ,x 2 1, interest us and this excludes two of the crossing points (see below) leaving the following seven possibilities, namely the four corners of the unit square
, and those whose location depends on parameter values, (i) We call A the crossing point of nullclines (A3) and (A8), whose coordinates are x 1 (A ) = 0 and
(ii) We call B the crossing point of nullclines (A5) and (A6), so that x 2 (B ) = 0 and
(iii) Finally, we call E the crossing of (A5) and (A8). Its coordinates are obtained as:
The (missing in the list) crossings of (A4)-(A8), and of (A5)-(A7), are easily seen to be always outside the unit square for the range of parameters considered. Also inside this range, the nongeneric event of nullclines' coincidence only could happen provided β = 1 and r > −p , at a value b c ( ,r; β = 1,p) = 1 + r−p 1−p . Only then, the exotic (forced by symmetry) situation in which there is a segment of marginally stable equilibria occurs.
To determine the bifurcation points, one uses the spectral analysis of tangent space perturbations around equilibria. The linearized evolution of small perturbations around the fixed point x * is given by the matrix
In what follows, the presentation of the results from the phase portrait analysis of the nonlinear coupled ODE (A2) tries to rationalize them in terms of evolutionary game theoretic concepts, within a thermodynamical limit (statistical physics) perspective. For simplicity, as well as to illustrate neatly the systematics that we follow, we analyze first the case of equal population sizes. For this case, where populations are identical (though distinguishable), the population interchange symmetry imposes that phase portrait is invariant under permutation of coordinates (x 1 ↔ x 2 ), a nongeneric property that limits severely the possible scenarios. The stability analysis of the equilibria shows that there are two generic scenarios for the sequence of bifurcations that appear when b increases from 1 
Note that the condition r = r c (p, ) that separates the regimes where the equilibrium D is unstable (r < −p ) or attractor (r > −p ), corresponds to the exact compensation of the surplus rN of defective intrapopulation interactions of a defector and the punishment p N it receives from interpopulation interactions. Below this critical value, full defection is unstable to cooperative fluctuations. But, as we have just seen, even in case the punishment from coupling is weaker than surplus, polarized states have their own basins of attraction, away from whole defection, at low values of b > 1 + . This can be rationalized from the role that punishment plays in our no interbreeding, punishing defective coupling setting. Populations' strategic polarization emerge as stable generic asymptotic states of evolution, even when defectors can afford external punishment (D being then fully stable): The duplex (two coupled populations) has always the option to become polarized or quasipolarized provided the initial conditions belong to its basin of attraction.
General case:
The parameter p determines the fraction of interpopulationto-intrapopulation interactions any agent plays per unit time in the symmetric (N 1 = N 2 ) case. This fraction changes to βp and p/β (β > 1) for small and large populations respectively, when symmetry of population interchange is absent. This combination of parameters regulates how important to the replicating power (fitness) of an individual the interpopulation coupling is, and we then see that for the largest population the effective coupling p/β is smaller. This makes the polarized state A (where population 1 is defective) more robust than the polarized state B, and provided both are attractors, the basin of attraction of A is correspondingly larger. This is a major qualitative change in the phase portrait of the velocity field of evolution in the absence of symmetry. The concomitant change is the shift, and in more extreme cases the disappearance, of the bifurcations associated to the quasipolarized equilibria A and B (i.e., b , if one considers the high b (→ ∞) limit, one easily finds that it can be either mixed type (state E, interior to the unit square) or quasipolarized (state A , on the vertical x 1 = 0) regarding its convergence to virtually full defection. The transition between these two qualitatively different high temptation limit behaviors, for given values of ,p, and r, is controlled by the value of the population ratio β and it occurs at the critical value
At this value of the population ratio, the bifurcation value b c A (where A collides with state E, this one entering into the unit square) formally diverges, so that the collision occurs (or doesn't), depending on the value of the population ratio β, for fixed value of p, r, and .
On the other side, the bifurcation value at b 
The different possible combinations of all the previous possibilities give the following scenarios. 
This analysis provides the three-dimensional phase diagram (r,β,b) for fixed, though arbitrary, and p. It exhibits a wealth of different macroscopic phases separated by critical lines and surfaces. It shows that polarized and quasipolarized phases dominate wide regions in parameter space. This illustrates the effects of interpopulation trade of fitness (even under the simplest possible structure of interpopulation and intrapopulation contacts) on the evolution of PD replicators. Note that if one uses the adjusted replicator equation introduced in Ref. [1] , the stability analysis of the fixed points of the dynamics could show some differences, as already remarked in Ref. [25] concerning the evolutionary dynamics of the Battle of the Sexes game.
